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By Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
Introduction: A Brief History of Inversions
“Inversion” transactions are defined in the recent
Treasury Report as “a transaction through which the
corporate structure of a U.S.-based multinational
group is altered so that a new foreign corporation,
typically located in a low- or no-tax country, replaces
the existing U.S. parent corporation as the parent of the
corporate group.”1
The first well-known inversion from the U.S. was
McDermott International’s relocation to Panama in
1983, which prompted the enactment of section
1248(i).2 The next inversion, more than 10 years later,
was Helen of Troy (1994), which prompted the IRS to
issue Notice 94-46, making inversions taxable to public
shareholders.3 Nevertheless, inversions continued,
with one transaction in each of 1996, 1997, and 1998.4
But as the Treasury Report notes, “there has been a
marked increase recently in the frequency, size, and
profile of the transactions.”5 There were no less than
six inversions in 1999,6 followed by at least two more
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah is the Irwin I. Cohn
Professor of Law and Director, International Tax
LLM Program, at the University of Michigan. This
article is based in part on the author’s testimony
before the Ways and Means Committee on April
25, 2002.
This article discusses “inversion” transactions,
in which a publicly traded U.S. corporation be-
comes a subsidiary of a newly established tax
haven parent corporation. In the last three years,
an increasing number of these transactions have
been taking place, undeterred by the shareholder-
level tax imposed by the IRS on them in 1994. The
article first discusses the reasons for the increas-
ing popularity of the transactions and the tax
goals they aim at achieving (primarily avoiding
subpart F and U.S. earnings stripping). The article
then discusses the tax policy implications of these
transactions. In the short run, the article suggests
that the proper response is a redefinition of the
concept of corporate residency. The article criti-
cizes the shareholder-based redefinitions em-
bodied in some current anti-inversion proposals,
and suggests instead adoption of a modified
“managed and controlled” test for all corpora-
tions. In the longer run, inversions may lead to
abandonment of residence based corporate taxa-
tion in favor of source-based taxation. If that is
the case, it is imperative to preserve the corporate
tax base by developing better methods of deter-
mining the source of income (for example, for-
mulary apportionment), and by putting some
limits on tax competition. The author would like
to thank Michael Barr, Peter Canellos, Merritt
Fox, David Hasen, Jim Hines, Doug Kahn, Kyle
Logue, Mike McIntyre, Dan Shaviro, David
Sicular, and Phil West for their helpful comments.
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1U.S. Treasury, Office of Tax Policy, Corporate Inversion
Transactions: Tax Policy Implications, Doc 2002-12218 (31
original pages), 2002 TNT 98-49 (May 21, 2002) (the Treasury
Report). For an excellent overview of inversions, see also New
York State Association Tax Section, Report on Outbound In-
version Transactions, Doc 2002-13085 (74 original pages), 2002
TNT 105-34 (May 24, 2002) (the NYSBA Report).
2All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended.
31994-1 C.B. 356 now reflected in the regulations under
section 367.
4Triton Energy, Tyco, Playstar. For a description of all these
transactions, see the NYSBA Report.
5Treasury Report, at 2.
6Fruit of the Loom, Gold Reserve, White Mountains In-
surance, PXRE, Amerist Insurance, Xoma.
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in 20007 and four in 2001.8 There was a temporary lull
after September 11, but there are currently at least three
new inversions that have been announced in 2002.9 In
the post-September 11 climate, these transactions have
raised public concerns, and there are currently six bills
pending in Congress to stop inversions.10
Why Inversions Now?
The significant increase in the frequency of inver-
sion transactions in the last three years raises the ques-
tion of what accounts for this trend.
As the Treasury Report notes, inversion transactions
are primarily tax driven: “U.S.-based companies and
their shareholders are making the decision to reincor-
porate outside the U.S. largely because of the tax
savings available.”11 Moreover, these transactions “in-
volve little or no operational change” in the company’s
business.12
The tax advantages from inversion transactions are
twofold. First, since the new parent of the group is not
a “U.S. shareholder,” the group can establish new
foreign operations without being subject to subpart F.
In some cases, the potential tax saving is significant
enough so that even foreign operations currently held
by the U.S. parent are transferred to the new foreign
parent, even though these transfers are generally tax-
able at the corporate level.13
Second, and no less significantly, the existence of a
new foreign parent may enable the U.S. group to re-
duce taxes on U.S.-source income by paying the parent
deductible interest and/or royalties through a treaty
jurisdiction such as Barbados or Luxembourg, and by
manipulating transfer pricing.14 In addition, U.S. risks
formerly insured in the U.S. may be reinsured overseas,
with deductible premiums and no U.S.-source income
to the reinsurer.15 Existing provisions such as sections
163(j) (the earnings stripping rule) and 482 appear to
be inadequate to prevent this erosion of U.S. corporate
tax on U.S.-source income.16
The combination of these postinversion tax ad-
vantages can lead to significant reductions in effective
overall tax rates for the group. For example, Coopers
Industries and Stanley Works have stated that they
expect their inversions to reduce their annual effective
tax rate by 12-17 percent (Coopers) and 7-9 percent
(Stanley).17 These reductions can translate into sig-
nificant dollar amounts — Tyco International, for ex-
ample, has been reported to save $400 million in 2001
by reason of its inversion,18 and Ingersoll Rand has
stated that it expects to increase net earnings after its
inversion by $40 million per year.19 Thus, the U.S. fisc’s
loss of revenues from inversions is likely to be sig-
nificant, which explains why even the current Treasury
is concerned.
The U.S. fisc’s loss of revenues from
inversions is likely to be significant,
which explains why even the current
Treasury is concerned.
If inversions are so tax effective, why did they not
take off before 1999? The principal reason appears to
be not tax-related, but rather involves the increased
market acceptance of the transaction. Until Tyco in-
verted successfully in 1997, investment bankers
generally assumed that a U.S. company would pay an
unacceptable price in its share value if it reincorporated
in Bermuda. This was the case even though U.S. secu-
rities law protections continue to apply to any stock
traded on a U.S. exchange, and the companies are not
delisted from, for example, the S&P 500. The presumed
drop in share value related to corporate governance
concerns and to reputational issues. But after Tyco, it
became clear that share prices do not drop as a result
of reincorporation — on the contrary, recently invert-
ing companies have seen their share prices rise in reac-
tion to the expected tax savings. Thus, despite the
recent troubles of Tyco and Global Crossing, there
seems to be no market downside to inversions.
In addition, as the Treasury Report notes, after the
market declines in 2000-2001, when most taxable share-
holders do not have big unrealized gains in their shares
and many corporations have net operating losses,
7Everest Re, Transocean.
8Coopers Industries, Foster Wheeler, Ingersoll Rand,
Global Marine. In addition, Accenture, formerly Andersen
Consulting, was established as a new Bermuda holding com-
pany for partnership assets.
9Stanley Works, Nabors, Weatherford International. In ad-
dition, Seagate Technology has been formed as a new
Cayman parent for U.S. operations, and PwC Consulting has
been formed in Bermuda to take over Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers consulting operations.
10See discussion of these bills below.
11Treasury Report, at 4.
12Treasury Report, at 3.
13Treasury Report, at 19-21. Another advantage is the
ability to avoid the onerous rules on sourcing interest ex-
pense. See Mihir A. Desai and James R. Hines Jr., “Expecta-
tions and Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and Conse-
quences of Inversion Transactions,” (forthcoming, National
Tax Journal), emphasizing this as a reason for inversions.
These rules should be amended, but that by itself will not
stop inversions, given the other incentives.
14Treasury Report, at 38-39; see also NYSBA Report. Limi-
tations on benefits rules, such as those in the Barbados and
Luxembourg treaties, do not typically apply to publicly
traded entities. See Barbados Treaty, Art. 22(3); Luxembourg
Treaty, Art. 24(2)(d). This exception should be restricted to
public trading in the residence country (i.e., Barbados or
Luxembourg), but the current treaties do not restrict it.
15Treasury Report, at 40.
16Section 163(j) permits stripping up to 50 percent of U.S.
income and has a generous safe harbor, and the IRS has not
won a major transfer pricing case under section 482 in more
than 20 years.
17Coopers Industries Proxy Statement (July 27, 2001); Stan-
ley Works Proxy Statement (Apr. 2, 2002).
18David Cay Johnston, “U.S. Corporations Are Using Ber-
muda to Slash Tax Bills,” New York Times, Feb. 18, 2002.
19Ingersoll-Rand Proxy Statement (Apr. 5, 2002).
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neither a shareholder-level tax nor even a corporate-
level tax is likely to deter inversion transactions.20 The
present value of the expected recurrent tax savings
overwhelms a one-time toll charge.
The Competitiveness Excuse
The Treasury Report highlights another purported
reason for inversions — the supposed competitiveness
concerns of U.S. multinationals. According to the Trea-
sury, “[t]he U.S. international tax rules can operate to
impose a burden on U.S. based companies with foreign
operations that is disproportionate to the tax burden
imposed by our trading partners on the foreign opera-
tions of their companies. . . . Both the recent inversion
activity and the increase in foreign acquisitions of U.S.
multinationals are evidence that the competitive dis-
advantage caused by our international tax rules is a
serious issue with significant consequences for U.S.
businesses and the U.S. economy.”21 Thus, the Treasury
recruits inversions as an argument in its quest for a
territorial tax regime for the U.S., labeling them “self
help territoriality,”22 and calling for a consideration of
“fundamental reform of the U.S. international tax rules,
including the merits of the exemption-based tax sys-
tems of some of our major trading partners.”23
There are well-known counterarguments to this line
of thinking, including: Is there a direct relationship
between the competitiveness of U.S. multinationals
and the competitiveness of the U.S. economy? What is
a “U.S. multinational,” anyway (inversions seem to
raise some questions on this point)? Is there any
evidence for the supposed competitive disadvantage,
or for the alleged harshness of our rules compared to
those of our trading partners?24 If a subsidy to U.S.
multinationals is needed, why limit it to foreign-source
income, since a subsidy directed at their domestic
operations would be just as effective? And finally, what
about the competitive disadvantage to U.S. companies
with purely U.S. operations, if a subsidy is given only
to U.S. multinationals by exempting their foreign-
source income?25
But it is not my intention here to rehash these old
arguments. Instead, I would like to emphasize that in
the inversion context the competitiveness issue is the
reddest of red herrings — a completely irrelevant line
of argument. To demonstrate this, try the following
thought experiment: Suppose nothing was done to
deter inversions, but the U.S. adopted an exemption
for foreign-source active income (for example, by ex-
empting dividends from this income from U.S. tax, as
some have suggested).26 Would inversions stop?
The answer is no, for three reasons. First, as the
Treasury Report notes, a major reason for inversions is
to reduce U.S. tax on U.S.-source income, which would
not be affected by the adoption of territoriality. Second,
inversions enable U.S. multinationals to avoid all of
subpart F, including the taxation of passive income.
None of the current proposals for territoriality go that
far, since this would be an open invitation to U.S. multi-
nationals to move their investment earnings overseas.
In the inversion context the
competitiveness issue is the reddest
of red herrings — a completely
irrelevant line of argument. 
But the major reason why inversions are unrelated
to competitiveness is the following: As even the Trea-
sury Report acknowledges in a footnote,27 all of our
major trading partners have regimes in place that tax
passive income of their multinationals. Some of these
regimes, in fact, are tougher than subpart F — the
French, for example, require only 10 percent ownership
of a foreign corporation to apply CFC rules to it, and
many countries include some low-tax active foreign
income in their regime.28 Permitting inversions gives
inverting U.S. multinationals a significant competitive
advantage over foreign multinationals and noninvert-
ing U.S. multinationals that have to pay tax currently
on their foreign-source passive income, at the expense
of the U.S. fisc. 
Thus, the whole competitiveness issue is mislead-
ing. It is not the reason for inversions, and inversions
would continue even if the U.S. adopted territoriality.
The competitiveness debate will doubtless go on (as it
has for the last 40 years), but it should not affect what
we do about inversions. 
20Treasury Report, at 51-52. In addition, many shareholders
are tax exempt. The prevalence of inversions involving a cor-
porate level tax shows that taxing inversions at the corporate-
level is not a sufficient deterrent.
21Treasury Report, at 7, 96.
22Treasury Report, at 97.
23Treasury Report, at 98.
24In fact, the Europeans have recently been complaining
about the harshness of their CFC rules. See discussion below.
25For these arguments, see, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “Tax
Competition and Multinational Competitiveness: The New
Balance of Subpart F,” Tax Notes Int’l, Apr. 19, 1999, p. 1575.
26See, e.g., Harry Grubert and John Mutti, Taxing Interna-
tional Business Income: Dividend Exemption Versus the Current
System. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute,
2001.
27Treasury Report, at fn. 50.
28See Brian J. Arnold and Patrick Dibout, “General Re-
port,” in Limits on the Use of Low Tax Regimes by Multinational
Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, Cahiers de
droit fiscal international LXXXVIb (San Francisco, 2001); see
also Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens, FEE Posi-
tion Paper of Controlled Foreign Company Legislations in the EU
(2002) (complaining of harshness of European CFC rules).
Even the base company rule has its analogues in the tax law
of many of our trading partners. See Arnold and Dibout,
supra.
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Currently Proposed Responses to Inversions
There are currently six bills pending in Congress to
deter inversions — four in the House and two in the
Senate.29
All of these bills share two common features. They
define an inversion as a transaction in which (a) a
foreign corporation acquires the stock or substantially
all the assets of a domestic corporation or partnership
and (b) more than 50 percent (or 80 percent) of the
foreign corporation’s stock (by vote or value) is held
by former shareholders of the domestic corporation (or
partners in a domestic partnership). In addition, some
of the bills add a requirement that the foreign corpo-
ration (and its group) not have “substantial business
activities” in its country of incorporation. If these
definitional prongs are met, the inverted corporation
is treated as a domestic corporation. (Some of the bills
also have lesser penalties if some but not all of the
prongs are met.)
The most problematic feature of the
proposed bills is their focus on the
composition of share ownership in the
new foreign parent.
All of these definitional prongs raise troubling is-
sues. First, the focus on the transfer of stock or sub-
stantially all the assets misses the point, which is that
a new parent corporation has taken over the group.
Thus, you could have an inversion even if significant
assets remain in the U.S. and are not transferred to the
new foreign parent (for example, by a split-off in which
they end up in a separate U.S. group owned by the
same shareholders). It would be better to define an
inversion directly as any transaction in which a foreign
corporation becomes the parent of an affiliated group
formerly headed by a U.S. corporation.30
Second, the focus on “substantial business ac-
tivities” in the foreign jurisdiction is likely to lead to
endless arguments about what is substantial enough (a
captive insurance company?). It would be better to
omit this prong altogether, or at least define it much
more explicitly. 
But the most problematic feature of the proposed
bills is their focus on the composition of share owner-
ship in the new foreign parent. First, this is likely to be
difficult for the IRS to administer. Publicly traded
shares change hands all the time, so it would be im-
possible for the IRS to track ownership continually. But
even if the test is restricted to ownership “immediately
after” the transfer, it would still be difficult to establish
beneficial ownership of shares held through nominees.
Second, the test is manipulable. Presumably, the IRS
could litigate transactions in which stock is temporari-
ly parked in the hands of new shareholders. But it may
not be a huge price to pay to avoid the threshold by
persuading a sufficient number of old shareholders to
permanently sell their shares to new shareholders as
part of the inversion. The IRS would find it hard to
litigate this scenario.31
The last point raises the fundamental problem with
a share ownership test: It is not related to what makes
a multinational U.S.-based, and management does not
care very much about the composition of public share-
holders. Large U.S. multinationals and large foreign
multinationals currently trade on 20 or more exchanges
all over the world. Their share ownership is widely
dispersed and it is doubtful whether some “U.S.” multi-
nationals have many more U.S. shareholders than some
“foreign” multinationals. In short, the share ownership
test is manipulable at little business cost precisely be-
cause it has little to do with what makes a publicly
traded multinational U.S.-based.32
Redefining Corporate Residence
If share ownership does not define a U.S. multi-
national, what does? This question is at the heart of the
inversion issue. It stems from a long-lasting debate
about whether multinationals have a national identity.
In the 1950s the distinction between a U.S. and a
foreign multinational was clear. A U.S. multinational
raised most of its capital (both debt and equity) in the
U.S., was managed from the U.S., and had most of its
operations and biggest market in the U.S. Although
there were some operations and sales overseas, the
bulk of the income came from the U.S. — and vice versa
for a foreign multinational. In that context it was in-
deed plausible to state that “what is good for GM is
good for America.”
Today, the distinction is far more cloudy. As Robert
Reich has pointed out, no distinction can be made be-
tween U.S. and foreign multinationals on the basis of
where their capital is raised (both trade shares and
borrow at home and overseas), where their operations
are (all over the world), and where their customers are
29See H.R. 3884, Corporate Patriot Enforcement Act of 2002
(Rep. Neal, March 6, 2002); H.R. 3857 (Rep. McInnis, March 6,
2002); H.R. 3922, Save America’s Jobs Act of 2002 (Rep.
Maloney, March 11, 2002); S. 2050 (Sens. Wellstone and
Dayton, March 21, 2002); S. 2119, Reversing the Expatriation
of Profits Offshore Act (Sens. Baucus and Grassley, April 11,
2002); H.R. 4756, Uncle Sam Wants You Act of 2002 (Rep. N.
Johnson, May 16, 2002).
30This definition would include takeovers by existing
foreign multinationals, but they could be excluded by the
other prongs.
31In the PwCC transaction, for example, this prong is not
met because U.S. persons own less than 50 percent of the stock
of the new Bermuda parent before the transaction, and con-
siderably less after the stock offering that is part of the trans-
action. PwCC prospectus (May 2, 2002).
32For securities law purposes, a foreign private issuer is
defined to exclude issuers more than 50 percent of whose
stock is held by U.S. residents and the majority of their ex-
ecutive officers or assets are in the U.S. or their business is
administered principally in the U.S. See Securities Act of
1933. Rule 405. Thus, mere U.S. shareholdership is not
enough.
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(the most profitable markets for U.S. multinationals are
frequently overseas).33
Reich would thus argue that there is no meaningful
distinction any more between U.S. and foreign multi-
nationals. In the tax area, this would suggest abandon-
ing residence-based taxation in favor of a purely
source-based (that is, territorial) regime.34
If properly defined and interpreted, the
managed and controlled test offers the
most promising current definition of
corporate residency — the one most
congruent with business realities and
therefore least open to abuse.
However, most Americans still believe that there is
a meaningful distinction between, say, GM and Toyota,
even though there is little significant difference in their
capital structure, operations, or markets. The differ-
ence, as Laura d’Andrea Tyson pointed out in response
to Reich, is that GM is run from Detroit, Toyota from
Tokyo.35 There even is a difference between GM and
DaimlerChrysler, because the latter (as Chrysler
management belatedly found out) is run from Stutt-
gart.
This would suggest that the immediate answer to
inversions is to change the way corporate residence is
defined for tax purposes. Instead of defining a U.S.
corporation as one incorporated in the U.S. and a
foreign corporation as one incorporated overseas, we
should adopt the definition used by many of our trad-
ing partners  —  from where the corporation is
“managed and controlled.”36
The “managed and controlled” test has a long his-
tory, some of which is not very distinguished. In par-
ticular, many former U.K. colonies have interpreted it
in a mechanical way to focus on where the Board of
Directors meets, which makes the test not less manipul-
able than the U.S. test. Boards do not mind meeting
twice a year in Bermuda. Even the U.K., from which
“managed and controlled” originated, has recently
supplemented it with a place of incorporation test.
And yet, if properly defined and interpreted, the
managed and controlled test offers the most promising
current definition of corporate residency — the one
most congruent with business realities and therefore
least open to abuse.37 That is because even in this age
of teleconferencing, there is a distinct business ad-
vantage in locating the principal officers of a corpora-
tion in one location where they can meet and run the
corporation on a daily basis. Thus, if one defines
“managed and controlled” as the place where the prin-
cipal officers of a corporation (the CEO and those
reporting to her) manage the corporation’s business on
a daily basis, one gets close to what actually distin-
guishes GM from Toyota.
The major advantage of this test is that it is difficult
to avoid without significant business cost. The prin-
cipal officers will not relocate to Bermuda for tax
reasons, because the personal and business costs of
actually living in a tax haven are too high. And it is
still very hard to run a corporation at long distance.38
Several objections can be raised against this pro-
posal.39 First, the test represents a significant departure
from a long-held U.S. tradition.40 But it is congruent
with the test used by many of our trading partners and
in tax treaties, and therefore will readily win interna-
tional acceptance — an important consideration when
changing international tax rules unilaterally. Second,
the proposed change will affect more than inversion
transactions. For example, it would catch corporations
newly incorporated overseas, such as Accenture,
PwCC, and Seagate. But that is actually an advantage,
since it is hard to distinguish as a policy matter be-
tween these transactions and “pure” inversions. Accen-
ture, PwCC, and Seagate, like Tyco and Stanley Works,
continue to be managed from the U.S. Third, the test
will not catch foreign takeovers of U.S. multinationals
(like Daimler/Chrysler or BP/Amoco). But these trans-
actions are motivated by business reasons and should
not be deterred.41
Finally, the proposed test does not draw a bright line
like the current, more formal one, and therefore invol-
ves some added measure of uncertainty. But it is clear
enough, and far more congruent with business realities
(and thus less manipulable) than place of incorpora-
tion. U.S. taxpayers have been living with less well-
defined terms, such as “effectively connected” and
33Robert Reich, “Who Is Us?” 68 Harv. Bus. Rev. 53 (1990);
Robert Reich, The Work of Nations (1993). A similar point is
made from a different political perspective in Edward M.
Graham and Paul R. Krugman, Foreign Direct Investment in the
United States (3rd ed. 1995), ch. 3.
34See Gary Hufbauer, U.S. Taxation of International Income:
Blueprint for Reform (1992); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “The Struc-
ture of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification,”
74 Texas L. Rev. 1301 (1996).
35Laura d’Andrea Tyson, “They Are Not Us,” The American
Prospect (Winter 1991).
36A corporation incorporated in the U.S. should be
presumed to be managed and controlled from the United
States.
37Note that there have been few inversions from Europe,
not because of territoriality (Europeans tax passive income
too), but because the managed and controlled test makes it
harder to invert.
38In addition, changes in the location of management and
control should be a taxable event at the corporate level. That
would deter tax-motivated expatriations under the new test.
39See NYSBA Report, which considers these issues but con-
cludes that “this alternative merits serious consideration and
study” (at 27). 
40For example, it may make many CFCs incorporated in
tax havens into domestic corporations. That is an advantage,
since it indicates they do not have a real business presence
overseas and thus should not enjoy deferral.
41It was not primarily tax considerations that led to Daim-
ler/Chrysler being a German corporation, it was the German
government’s determination to protect Daimler and co-deter-
mination.
COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT
TAX NOTES, June 17, 2002 1797
“U.S. trade or business.” They can learn to live with
“managed and controlled” as well.
A Modified Source-Based Regime
In the longer term, however, Reich may be right and
residence-based corporate taxation may be doomed.
With advances in technology, it may one day be pos-
sible to efficiently run a multinational enterprise from
multiple locations via an intranet, without the need to
meet face to face. In that case, the headquarters-based
definition of corporate residency offered above would
become obsolete. This is not likely to happen, however,
in the next couple of decades, even if a “managed and
controlled” test is adopted (and there is therefore a tax
incentive to disperse top management).
If residence-based corporate taxation
becomes impossible, the only way to
continue to tax multinationals is on
the basis of source. In principle, this
would not be a terrible outcome.
If residence-based corporate taxation becomes im-
possible (much to the chagrin of economists, who tend
to prefer it), the only way to continue to tax multina-
tionals is on the basis of source.42 In principle, this
would not be a terrible outcome, because the current
international tax regime assigns the primary right to
tax active business income to the source jurisdiction,
for good reasons.43
However,  a  pure source-based regime is
problematic, for two reasons. First, it fosters tax com-
petition among source jurisdictions, not just for passive
but also for active income, leading to erosion of the
corporate tax base. Second, the current source rules
(and their cousin transfer pricing) are notoriously
manipulable and if left unchanged in a purely source-
based world, would lead to massive shifting of income
to low-tax jurisdictions.44
The first problem can be addressed by limiting tax
competition, as the OECD is currently trying to do.
However, the ability to do this would itself be com-
promised by a demise of residence-based taxation. Cur-
rently, OECD members are the residence jurisdictions
for 85 percent of the world’s multinationals. Therefore,
a major focus of the OECD effort has been to expand
CFC regimes in its member countries, thus eliminating
the incentives of source countries to engage in tax com-
petition. But if residence jurisdiction succumbs, then
the OECD can only restrict competition by its members
and (perhaps) by pressuring the weaker tax havens. It
can do little about tax competition by nonmembers that
are not tax havens, but have preferential regimes to
attract foreign investors.
If the OECD cannot be relied on to limit tax com-
petition, what can be done? One possibility is to use
the WTO, since some preferential regimes (involving
export of goods) are export subsidies under WTO rules.
But the WTO subsidies code does not currently cover
services, and therefore does not address the tax haven
problem and financial services (the current focus of the
OECD effort). In addition, as the FSC litigation shows,
combating export subsidies via the WTO is a long and
cumbersome process.
A potential solution to both issues (tax competition
and sourcing) involves a general shift to formulary
apportionment in a way that restricts the ability of
multinationals to shift income to jurisdictions in which
they have no substantial economic activity (measured,
for example, by payroll, tangible assets, or arm’s length
sales). But even that would leave “production tax
havens” (preferential regimes for real activities) in
place, unless some kind of throwback rule that reas-
signed low-tax income to other jurisdictions was
agreed on.45 In any case, the adoption of such an agreed
on formula seems at present unlikely, although the
recent EU proposals in this direction are a promising
start.46
The most plausible long-term solution to the
problems of source-based taxation involves a coor-
dinated effort by the large market jurisdictions (most
of whom are OECD members) to tax multinationals on
sales into their markets. The key consideration is that
market jurisdictions do not typically engage in tax
competition to attract imports. Thus, one could impose
a withholding tax on sales to consumers in a given
market (such as the EU tax on e-commerce sales to
consumers). Such a tax can be modeled on a destina-
tion-based VAT, but designed to replicate the corporate
income tax base. Moreover, a credit or refund can be
given for taxes imposed by other source jurisdictions,
thus providing an incentive to them to refrain from tax
competition.47
42Note, however, that the U.S. Treasury’s E-Commerce
White Paper (1996) predicted the demise of source-based taxa-
tion because of e-commerce, and recommended re-evaluation
of corporate residency.
43For these reasons see Avi-Yonah, Structure, supra note
34.
44Subpart F was after all enacted in part as a backstop to
section 482. Note that the tax expenditure budget’s relatively
modest estimate of the potential gain from abolishing defer-
ral ($8 billion) is not the same as the potential loss from
adopting a pure territorial system (much more). Pure terri-
toriality is not the same as exempting dividends from active
income, which Grubert and Mutti, above, argue is a revenue
raiser.
45Admittedly, whether production tax havens pose a prob-
lem is debatable. For an argument that they are, see Reuven
S. Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax Competition and the Fiscal
Crisis of the Welfare State,” 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (2000).
46See EU Commission, Company Taxation in the Internal
Market (2002), 501-504 (“Despite complications, in practice
[formulary apportionment] works”).
47For a fuller elaboration of the details of this proposal see
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “International Taxation of Electronic
Commerce,” 52 Tax L. Rev. 507 (1997); Avi-Yonah, Globaliza-
tion, supra note 45.
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Conclusion
The current international tax regime is based on two
principles: The single tax principle and the benefits
principle.48 The single-tax principle states that cross-
border transactions should be subject to a single level
of tax — no more but also no less.49 The benefits prin-
ciple sets the tax rate by allocating passive income
primarily to the residence jurisdiction and active in-
come primarily to the source jurisdiction.
The inversion issue illustrates the potential tension
between the two principles: If active income is taxed
purely on a source basis (under the benefits principle),
there will be zero taxation if income can be sourced to
no-tax jurisdictions (a violation of the single-tax prin-
ciple). Residence-based taxation of corporations was
designed by T.S. Adams (the inventor of the foreign tax
credit) to prevent zero taxation by having the residence
country pick up the tax when there is no source-based
taxation. That was the reason Adams rejected terri-
toriality.50
If residence-based corporate taxation becomes im-
possible because technological developments have re-
duced corporate residence to meaninglessness, some
other solution needs to be found to preserve the cor-
porate tax base.51 A source-based tax on sales into
market jurisdictions is the most plausible solution. But
I am not convinced that as of 2002, corporate residence
has lost its meaning as a business concept, if it is
redefined as where the corporation is actually run
from. That, and not a narrow fix focused on the inden-
tity of shareholders, is the immediate solution to the
inversions problem.
48See Avi-Yonah, Electronic Commerce, supra note 47.
49Interestingly, the Treasury Report acknowledges this
when it states that the purpose of tax treaties is to “reduce
or eliminate double taxation of income, not eliminate all
taxation of income.” Treasury Report, at 78. This seems in-
congruent with the Treasury’s support of a territorial tax
regime that exempts foreign-source income regardless of
whether it was taxed overseas. Note that the adoption of a
territorial regime for the U.S. without changing the source
rules (e.g., the title passage rule) would leave us vulnerable
to WTO action, since it would be an export subsidy.
50See Michael J. Graetz and Michael O’Hear, “The Original
Intent of U.S. International Taxation,” 46 Duke L. J. 1021
(1997).
51Of course, this assumes that the corporate tax should be
preserved, an issue I hope to address elsewhere.
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